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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Despite lacking a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, a police officer entered
Jesse Rebo's home and arrested him for violating a no contact order. The district court denied
Mr. Rebo's motion to suppress the methamphetamine later discovered on his person by jail
deputies, reasoning that the existence of the no contact order rendered Mr. Rebo's subjective
expectation of privacy in his own home objectively unreasonable. The district court's ruling is in
error, as the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the Fourth Amendment grants
residents standing to challenge the warrantless governmental intrusion into their houses based
upon traditional notions of properly rights, regardless of any theoretical notions of reasonable
expectations of privacy.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On February 5, 2017, Officer Emily Taylor of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department
arrested Jesse Reho at the residence he shared with his wife of ten years, Naomi Reho, and
charged Mr. Reho with misdemeanor domestic assault, naming Ms. Reho as the victim.
(R.,pp.151-67; PSI, p.15.) 1 Mr. Reho was arraigned on the charge the following day, and the
presiding magistrate issued a no contact order prohibiting Mr. Reho from being within 300 feet
of their shared home, unless accompanied by an officer. (R., pp.146-48.)
A little over a week later, the State filed new charges against Mr. Reho including
possession of methamphetamine, attempting to introduce major contraband into the jail,
misdemeanor violation of a no contact order, and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing an

1

Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and its attached documents will include the
page number associated with the 55-page electronic file containing the confidential exhibits.
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officer. (R., pp.20-22.) During the preliminary hearing, Officer Taylor testified that she was on
routine patrol on the night of February 14, 2017, when she decided to go check out the Rebo
residence. 2 (Tr. Prelim, p.4, L.12 - p.5, L.11; p.11, Ls.2-15.)3 When she saw Mr. Rebo standing
in the back of a pickup parked behind his house and speaking with Ms. Rebo, Officer Taylor
confirmed that the no contact order was still valid, and called for additional patrol officers to
come to the location. (Tr. Prelim, p.5, L.12 -p.6, L.20; p.11, L.21 - p.12, L.19.) Officer Taylor
then flashed her flashlight and said "police," but neither she nor any other officer gave Mr. Rebo
any commands or told him that he was under arrest. (Tr. Prelim, p.6, Ls.18-24; p.14, L.1 - p.15,
L.5.) Mr. Rebo ran into his house and shut the door; Officer Taylor followed him, knocked on
the door, and after waiting about five seconds, entered into Mr. Rebo's house where she arrested
him for violating the no contact order and resisting or obstructing an officer. (Tr. Prelim, p.6,
L.21 - p.8, L.2; p.15, Ls.17-23.) After Mr. Rebo was transported to jail, a jail deputy searched
him and found a small baggy containing methamphetamine in the coin pocket of his pants.
(Tr. Prelim, p.8, L.3 - p.10, L.21; p.19, L.24 - p.21, L.22; Ex. 1.)
Mr. Rebo was bound over into the district court and a four-count information was filed
charging him with the above crimes. (R., pp.67-69.) Mr. Rebo filed a motion to suppress the
methamphetamine found on his person at the jail alleging that it was the fruit of Officer Taylor
violating his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home without a warrant, consent, or
exigent circumstances, in order to arrest him for a misdemeanor offense. (R., pp.82-99.) The
State filed a brief in response, arguing that Officer Taylor was in "hot pursuit" of Mr. Rebo

2

Ms. Rebo had filed a motion to modify or terminate the no contact order the previous day.

(R., pp.142, 145.)
3

The transcript of the preliminary hearing is included as an exhibit to the appellate record.
2

because she observed him violate the no contact order, and she was "concerned about domestic
violence and the defendant's further flight from capture .... " 4 (R., pp.100-06.)
During a hearing on Mr. Reho' s motion to suppress, the parties stipulated that they would
rely solely on the evidence presented during the preliminary hearing. (Tr. p.9, Ls.6-24.) After
hearing the arguments of counsel regarding whether Officer Taylor's warrantless entry into
Mr. Rebo's home was constitutionally reasonable, the district court indicated that it was
concerned about whether Mr. Reho had standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation, due to
the existence of the no contact order. (Tr. p.9, L.25 - p.19, L.10.) Both parties acknowledged
that Officer Taylor indeed arrested Mr. Reho inside the residence he shared with Ms. Reho, and
the State even offered to stipulate that the arrest occurred inside Mr. Rebo's residence.
(Tr., p.19, L.11 -p.21, L.10.) After taking a recess, the court continued the hearing, allowing the
parties to submit any additional evidence and briefing on the issue of whether Mr. Reho had
standing to challenge the warrantless entry into his home, due to the existence of the no contact
order. (Tr., p.21, L.14 - p.23, L.6.) Mr. Reho submitted supplemental briefing arguing that he
has standing to challenge the warrantless entry into his home, "because the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution protect
[against] physical entry of a person's home. No Idaho caselaw holds otherwise." (R., pp.11214.) The State declined the opportunity to provide any additional briefing. (R., pp. I I 0-11.)
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Notably, Officer Taylor did not actually testify that she entered Mr. Rebo's home due to any
concern about domestic violence or flight. (Tr. Prelim, p.3, L.3 -. p.19, L.15.) This is likely due
to the fact that Officer Taylor did not observe any actual domestic dispute between the Rebos at
the time, Ms. Reho was standing outside of the home when Officer Taylor entered it to arrest
Mr. Reho, and because three other patrol units had arrived by that time and would have
undoubtedly been able to secure the residence while seeking a warrant and/or asking Ms. Reho
for consent to enter. (R., p.24; Tr. Prelim, p.3, L.3 -p.19, L.15.)
3

At a subsequent hearing, the district asked for additional briefing on whether it could take
judicial notice of the no contact order and other documents related to Mr. Reho' s arrest, and
again requested briefing on whether Mr. Reho had standing to assert a Fourth Amendment
violation. (Tr., p.40, L.4 - p.47, L.2.) This time, the State filed a brief arguing that even if
Mr. Reho had a subjective expectation of privacy in his residence, it was not objectively
reasonable: "When an individual has been court-ordered to stay away from a specific location,
society cannot continue to recognize the privacy right in that place." (R., pp.128-31.) Mr. Reho
submitted his own additional memorandum, again asserting that he had standing to challenge the
warrantless entry into his own home. (R., pp.133-39.)
The district court took judicial notice of relevant documents and orally pronounced its
decision during a subsequent hearing. (R., pp.141-69.) The court found that Mr. Reho was in
fact arrested inside his own residence and that the State failed to prove Officer Taylor's
warrantless entry into the home was justified by any exigent circumstances, considering the fact
that Naomi Reho was not in the house at the time but was rather outside in the presence of other
officers, and the officers could have secured the house from the outside in order to prevent
Mr. Reho from fleeing. (Tr., p.54, L.25 - p.57, L.5.) However, relying primarily on a case from
Washington, State v. Jacobs, 2 P.3d 974 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), the court found that Mr. Reho
did not have standing to challenge the warrantless entry into his home. (Tr., p.57, L.6 - p.60,
L.11.) The Court ruled,
In this case, the house had been occupied by Mr. Reho and by Ms. Reho.
To a certain extent, it could be considered their house and his house as well as her
house. And by running into the house, he certainly exhibited an actual subjective
expectation of privacy. He wanted to get away from the police officers.
However, when viewed objectively, I don't find that Mr. Reho and his
expectation of privacy was reasonable under the circumstances here.

4

A court order had been entered prohibiting him from being at the
residence occupied by his wife. She was there; he was there. The circumstances
indicate that he was aware of the issuance of the no contact order that covered her
residence.
In this case, Mr. Reho fled into the house to escape the police officers.
The police officers were there to enforce the very order prohibiting him from
having contact with Ms. Reho and going within 300 feet of her residence. I don't
find that Mr. Reho had an objective reasonable expectation of privacy in the
house occupied by Ms. Reho after that no contact order had been issued, and he
had notice of that order. So I don't find that he has carried his burden to prove
the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house where he was
arrested and doesn't have standing to complain about the warrantless entry by the
police officers.
An objectively reasonable expectation of privacy is one that society deems
reasonable or legitimate. That expectation of privacy must be more than
subjective expectation of not being discovered here, where there was an order
prohibiting him from being in the residence or near the residence to allow him to
assert that he had an expectation of privacy, where a court order prohibited him
from being would seem contrary to the expectations that society would recognize
as being a legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy. For those reasons, and
based on those findings and conclusions, I will deny the motion to suppress the
evidence.
(Tr., p.58, L.22 - p.60, L.11.)
Mr. Reho entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, violation
of a no contact order, and resisting or obstructing an officer, preserving his right to appeal the
court's order denying his motion to suppress.

(R., pp.171-78; Tr., p.64, L.4 - p.70, L.1.)

Mr. Reho timely appealed from the district court's order placing him on probation. (R., pp.197212.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rebo's motion to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rebo's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
"The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history.

At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)
(citation omitted). In denying Mr. Rebo's motion to suppress, the district court focused on the
question of whether he had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his own home, in
light of the no contact order. However, a reasonable expectation of privacy is not the only
source for Fourth Amendment standing. Standing to challenge the warrantless entry into one's
own home also stems from traditional notions of property rights, and the fact that such an
intrusion is the very common-law trespass by government officials the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect people from. The district court's finding that Mr. Reho did not have standing
to assert a Fourth Amendment violation stemming from Officer Taylor's warrantless entry into
his own home is in error.

B.

As A Matter Of Well-Established Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, Mr. Reho Has
Standing To Challenge The Warrantless Entry Into His Home
When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, Idaho appellate Courts "accept[] the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely review[] the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,
414-15 (2017) (citation omitted). The district court held Mr. Reho did not have standing to
challenge Officer Taylor's entry into his home, reasoning that the existence of the no contact
order rendered any expectation of privacy he has unreasonable. The existence and terms of the

7

no contact order, and the fact that Mr. Reho was arrested inside his own home are not in dispute;
therefore, the question of whether Mr. Reho has standing to assert a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights is purely a question of law for this Court to decide.
A defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure
conducted by government agents must first establish standing. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978). "That inquiry ... requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure
has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect." Id. at 140. Therefore, in order to establish standing, Mr. Reho was required only to
demonstrate that Officer Taylor infringed upon his own Fourth Amendment rights. Since the
violation at issue here is Officer Taylor's warrantless entry into his own home, Mr. Reho clearly
met this thresho Id.
The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (emphasis added). "[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the
home is first among equals." Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). "In terms that apply
equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a
firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
By its plain language the Fourth Amendment protects Mr. Rebo's right to be secure in his
"houses." Officer Taylor's entry into Mr. Rebo's home without a warrant or consent clearly
infringed upon Mr. Rebo's interest in being secure in his home - an interest the Fourth

8

Amendment unequivocally protects. See Payton. 445 U.S. at 590; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. Thus,
Mr. Rebo has standing to challenge Officer Taylor's warrantless entry into his home.
The district court's analysis focused solely on the question of whether the existence of the
no contact order rendered Mr. Rebo's subjective expectation of privacy in his home, objectively
unreasonable. (Tr., p.57, L.6 - p.60, L.11.) While it is true that standing may be established by
demonstrating a violation of the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
searched or the items seized, that is not the only way standing can be established.

States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-08 (2012).

United

Prior to the Supreme Court's recognition in

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places," the United States Supreme Court equated Fourth Amendment rights with property
rights, and analyzed violations of those rights by comparing the governmental actions to
common-law trespass jurisprudence.

Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-08.

"[T]he Katz reasonable-

expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test." Id. at 409 (emphasis in original). 5 Therefore, even if the court was correct and under the

Katz test society would not recognize that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their own home if a court orders them not to be there, 6 that person still has standing to challenge

5

The Jacobs decision, the Washington Court of Appeals opinion the district court relied upon,
does not suggest otherwise. The defendant in Jacobs did not live at the residence in which he
attempted to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy; instead, he merely kept some clothing
there and was granted permission to visit "regularly to shower and change clothes." 2 P.3d at 88.
Thus, the defendant's lack of standing did not stem merely from the existence of a no contact
order, but rather from the fact that he had no Fourth Amendment interests in the home at all, as
he did not live there and he was not an overnight guest. Id.
6
It is far from clear that Idahoans would deem an expectation of privacy in one's own home
objectively unreasonable, merely due to the existence of a court order requiring that person to be
elsewhere for a given period of time. If that were the case, any time a person was called for jury
duty, subpoenaed to appear as a witness, or was arrested and ordered held in jail, police officers
could break into their homes, rummage through their personal belongings, and seize whatever
they want, and the resident would have no standing to claim a Fourth Amendment violation. It
9

a governmental intrusion into their home under long-standing United States Supreme Court
precedent recognizing that such an invasion is a common-law trespass.
In this case, it is undisputed that Officer Taylor entered Mr. Reho' s home uninvited - she
trespassed. Mr. Reho has standing to challenge that violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
The district court erred in finding otherwise.

C.

The District Court Correctly Determined That There Was No Exigency That Justified
Officer Taylor's Warrantless Entry Into Mr. Rebo's Home
"[A] warrantless entry into a private residence is presumptively prohibited by the Fourth

Amendment." State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (1993) (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 586; Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984)). The State must "show that the entry was based upon

probable cause and that exigent circumstances existed necessitating immediate police action."
Id. (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 573) (emphasis in original). "[T]he police bear a heavy burden

when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or
arrests." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50.
The State argued to the district court that Officer Taylor's entry into Mr. Reho' s home
was justified because she had probable cause to arrest him for violation of the no contact order,
and because Officer Taylor was "concerned about domestic violence and the defendant's further
flight from capture .... " (R., pp.105-06.) Mr. Reho concedes that Officer Taylor had probable
cause to arrest him for misdemeanor violation of a no contact order; however, as the district
court correctly found, there were no exigencies justifying Officer Taylor's warrantless entry into
Mr. Rebo's home in order to make the arrest. (Tr., p.55, L.3 - p.57, L.5.) Officer Taylor's

seems highly unlikely that Idahoans would fmd that showing up for jury duty carries with it the
total relinquishment of standing to challenge a warrantless entry into their homes by law
enforcement.
10

supposed concern about domestic violence was based upon her knowledge of past domestic
violence between Mr. and Ms. Rebo, but was not an exigent circumstance in this case Mr. Reho posed no danger to Ms. Reho as she was standing outside the home with other officers
around her when Officer Taylor trespassed into the Rebo home. (R., p.24; Tr. Prelim, p.3, L.3 p.19, L.15.) Furthermore, any theoretical concern about Mr. Rebo' s flight could not justify entry
into the home, because those same officers, in addition to Officer Taylor herself, would certainly
have been able to prevent Mr. Rebo from leaving simply by standing outside and making sure he
did not leave. (Id.)
The district court correctly found that the State failed to meet its heavy burden to
demonstrate an exigency that justified Officer Taylor's warrantless entry into Mr. Rebo's home.

D.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Methamphetamine Discovered As A
Fruit Of Officer Taylor's Illegal Entry
If evidence is not seized either pursuant to a valid warrant or pursuant to a recognized

exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search or
seizure must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).

As demonstrated above, Officer Taylor violated Mr. Rebo's Fourth

Amendment rights by entering his home without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, in
order to arrest him for a misdemeanor. The district court erred in denying Mr. Rebo's motion to
suppress the methamphetamine discovered as a fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation.

11

CONCLUSION
Mr. Reho respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and
commitment, and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 11 th day of December, 2019.

/s/ Jason C. Pinder
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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